On the Distribution of Money Holdings in a Random-Matching Model by Berentsen, Aleksander
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
On the Distribution of Money Holdings
in a Random-Matching Model
Aleksander Berentsen
University of Basel
2002
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37319/
MPRA Paper No. 37319, posted 13. March 2012 15:03 UTC
On the Distribution of Money Holdings in a
Random-Matching Model*
Aleksander Berentsen1
Economics Department, University of Basel, Switzerland
Shortened Title: On the Distribution of Money Holdings
Abstract
This paper studies stationary and nonstationary distributions of money holdings in a
random-matching model. The first part characterizes the stationary distributions of money
holdings and derives the optimum quantity of money. The second part considers nonsta-
tionary distributions of the optimum quantity of money to show that if the production
costs are not too large, any distribution of the optimum quantity of money converges
asymptotically to the uniform distribution.
Keywords
Optimum Quantity of Money, Distribution of Money Holdings, Convergence, Search
Equilibrium
JEL
D51, E40, E52
0Submission: February 28, 2000; Revision: November 28, 2000; Accepted: December 14, 2000
1I wish to thank Ernst Baltensperger, Marianne Bürgi, Miguel Molico, Guillaume Rocheteau, Randall
Wright, Ruilin Zhou, and two anonymous referees for their very valuable comments. I also gratefully
acknowledge financial support from a grant received by the Swiss National Science Foundation.
1
1 Introduction
This paper extends the basic search-theoretic model of money developed by Kiyotaki and
Wright (1991, 1993) by allowing agents to accumulate money up to the bound n ∈ N+.
First, it generalizes the result obtained in Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993) that the
optimal quantity of money is 1/2 when the upper bound is n = 1 to show that the optimal
quantity of money is n/2 when the upper bound is n. Second, it demonstrates that if the
production cost are not too large, any initial distribution of the optimum amount of money
converges asymptotically to the uniform distribution.
Following the seminal work of Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993), several articles have
either relaxed the fixed price assumption (Trejos and Wright, 1995; Shi, 1995; Berentsen,
Molico, and Wright, 2000), the one-unit constraint on money holdings (Berentsen, 2000;
Rocheteau, 2000), or both (Corbae and Camera, 1999; Green and Zhou, 1998a; Molico,
1998; Taber and Wallace, 1999; Zhou, 1999). A further line of research has developed
tractable versions of the search framework with fully divisible money (Berentsen and Ro-
cheteau, 2000; Shi, 1997, 1999; Lagos and Wright, 2001).
This paper relaxes the one-unit constraint on money holdings, but money and com-
modities must still exchange one for one. This intermediate step is interesting in its own
right. First, it allows for an analysis of nonstationary distributions of money holdings
that–with the exception of Green and Zhou (1998b)–has not been carried out yet. Sec-
ond, it complements the analysis of stationary equilibria by Corbae and Camera (1999)
and Zhou (1999), where commodities are exchanged for one indivisible unit of money, by
focusing on the welfare properties of these equilibria.
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2 The model
The economy is populated by a [0, 1] continuum of infinite-lived agents who specialize in
consumption and production. The commodities are indivisible and are nonstorable (to rule
out commodity money). Let Xi be the set of goods that agent i consumes. No agent i
produces a good in Xi. Moreover, for a pair of agents i and j selected at random, the
probability that i produces a good in Xj and also j produces a good in Xi is 0 (there are
no double coincidences of real wants), while the probability that i produces a good in Xj
but j does not produce a good in Xi is x ∈ (0, 1). For example, if there are J goods and
J types, J > 2, and each type i agent consumes only good i and produces only good i+ 1
(mod J), then x = J−1.
Consuming one unit of a consumption good in Xi yields utility U > 0. Consuming one
of the other commodities yields zero utility. Production of one unit of a real commodity
costs C with U > C ≥ 0. In addition to the consumption goods, there is also an object
called fiat money. Fiat money comes in indivisible units of size one, is storable, and cannot
be consumed by any agent. Agents can accumulate money up to the bound n ∈ N+.
The model is in continuous time, and agents meet according to a Poisson process with
arrival rate α. Total population is normalized to one, and the measure of agents of each type
is the same, which implies that the rate at which an agent meets other agents of a particular
type is αx. Denote by mi (t) the probability that at time t a randomly chosen agent has
accumulated i units of money, and denote by m (t) = {m0 (t) , ...,mn (t)} a probability
measure (satisfying
Pn
i=0mi (t) = 1). The probability that a randomly selected agent has
accumulated less than n units of money is 1 − mn (t), and the probability that he has
accumulated at least one unit of money is 1 −m0 (t). Accordingly, the rate at which an
agent meets a potential buyer is pb = αx (1−mn (t)), and the rate at which he meets a
potential seller is ps = αx (1−m0 (t)).
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Throughout the paper the quantity of money,M , is assumed to be constant. Note that
for any n the quantity of money is bounded in [0, n]: If no agent holds money, the quantity
of money is zero, and if all agents hold n units of money, the quantity is n. Moreover, at
any point of time the probability measure m (t) must satisfy
M =
nX
i=0
imi (t) .
As in Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993), money is indivisible and agents cannot hold
more than one unit of money when they search for a trading opportunity.2 However, in
contrast to their models, agents are able to accumulate money by storing their money
holdings at home. This assumption makes the pricing decision very simple, because two
matched agents either exchange money for goods one for one or do not trade at all. This
simplification allows us to focus on the welfare and convergence properties of the model.
In this section, stationary equilibria where mi (t) = mi are considered only. Denote the
expected utility (value function) of an agent with money holdings i, i = 0, ..., n, by V i.
Then, if r is the rate of time preferences, the value functions satisfy
rV 0 = psmax {V 1 − V 0 − C, 0}
rV i = pbmax {U + V i−1 − V i, 0}+ psmax {V i+1 − V i − C, 0} , i = 0, ..., n− 1,
rV n = pbmax {U + V n−1 − V n, 0}
(1)
For example, the first equation sets the flow value of being an agent with no money, rV 0,
equal to the rate at which he meets an agent who buys his product, ps, times the gain of
either producing for money or refusing to do so.
Definition 1 For any n > 0 and M ∈ (0, n), a stationary monetary equilibrium is a list
hV,mi that satisfies the following conditions:
2Berentsen and Rocheteau (2001) analyse the implications of indivisible money for the eﬃciency of
monetary exchange in the Kiyotaki-Wright framework.
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i) V satisfies (1) taking the probability measure m as given,
ii) the probability measure m is stationary taking the values function V as given, and
iii) V > 0.
According to the first part of Definition 1, the monetary equilibrium is a Nash equilib-
rium for a given probability measure m. The second part requires that the economy be in
a steady state given the selling and buying activities induced by equations (1). The third
part requires that money have value.
Lemma 1 establishes the existence and uniqueness of a stationary distribution of money
(stationary probability measure m) when agents accumulate money up to the bound n.
Lemma 1 For any n andM ∈ (0, n), if agents accumulate money up to the bound n, there
is a unique stationary probability measure m which satisfies
mi = m
(n−in )
0 m
( in)
n , i = 0, ..., n (2)
nX
i=0
m
(n−in )
0 m
( in)
n = 1 (3)
mn
mn−1
=
mn−1
mn−2
= ... =
m1
m0
=
1−m0
1−mn
. (4)
Proof: See appendix. ¥
Two comments are in order here. First, a similar characterization of the stationary
distribution of money holdings has been independently developed by Zhou (1999) and
Camera and Corbae (1999). Second, the uniqueness result is derived by the assumption
that agents cannot spend more than one unit of money at a time. Without this restriction,
there may be many other stationary distributions, including a similar class of equilibria
where agents treat j < nunits of money as one (Zhou 1999).
It is well established that in this model when C > 0 there is an endogenous upper
bound I (Berentsen 2000). The existence of I is due to two properties of the model. First,
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the marginal expected utility of money is a monotonically decreasing function of money
holdings. Second, the cost of acquiring one unit of money (the production cost C) is
constant. For small money holdings, the increase in the expected utility outweighs the
cost, and for large money holdings, the cost is larger than the benefit. Accordingly, if C is
large, I < n and agents are only willing to sell for money when i < I.
Lemma 2 For any n and money supply M ∈ (0, n), if C ≤ C˜, where C˜ > 0 is defined in
the proof, a unique stationary monetary equilibrium exists.
Proof: See appendix. ¥
According to Lemma 2, for any exogenous upper bound n and any quantity of money
M , if the production costs are not too large, agents are willing to accumulate money up
to the bound n. The uniqueness of the equilibrium is a consequence of Lemma 1.
In the following, for a given bound n the optimum amount of money and its unique
stationary distribution are derived. Welfare is defined by W (M,n) =
Pn
i=0miV
i, which
measures the ex ante expected utility of all agents (or a single agent) before money is
distributed among them.
Proposition 1 For any n and money supplyM ∈ (0, n), in a stationary monetary equilib-
rium rW (M,n) = αx (1−mn) (1−m0) (U − C). Moreover, the quantity of moneyM = n2
and the distribution mi = 1n+1 , i = 0, ..., n, maximize W (M,n).
Proof: Multiply each value function of (1) by its measure and then add the value
functions to get
rW (M,n) = αx (1−mn) (1−m0) (U − C)−
nX
i=1
(pbmi − psmi−1)
¡
V i − V i−1
¢
In a stationary monetary equilibrium (pbmi − psmi−1) = 0, i = 1, ..., n. Hence, rW (M,n) =
αx (1−mn) (1−m0) (U − C). Next, maximizeW (M,n) with respect tom0 subject to (3)
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to get m0 = mn. Given this, Lemma 1 immediately implies that mi = 1n+1 , i = 0, ..., n.
Accordingly, the optimum quantity of money is n
2
. ¥
The intuition for this result is straightforward. No trade takes place between an ap-
propriate seller and an appropriate buyer if and only if either the buyer has no money or
the seller has money holdings n. Consequently, welfare is maximized when the measure
of agents in either of these two states is minimized, and this is attained with the uniform
distributionmi = 1n+1 , i = 0, ..., n. The uniform distribution then immediately implies that
the optimum quantity of money is n/2. Note that Proposition 1 generalizes Kiyotaki and
Wright’s (1991, 1993) welfare analysis. In their models, when no barter trade is possible,
the optimum amount of money is 1/2.3
In Proposition 2 welfare maximization is constrained to stationary distributions of
money. There are nonstationary distributions of the optimum quantity of money that can
temporarily increase (but also decrease) the frequency of trades (and accordingly welfare).
This increase, however, is temporal, because the distribution of money converges to the
unique stationary distribution associated with the optimum quantity of money, as shown
in Section 3.
3Note that the optimum quantities of money and welfare are strictly increasing in n. Thus, a social
planner would choose n = I. Moreover, when r → 0, I →∞, which implies that when r → 0 the optimum
quantity of money becomes infinitely large. In this limiting economy, almost no agent is constrained by
his money holdings. This result relates to Friedman’s (1969) observation that an eﬃcient monetary system
requires that agents be constrained by their average flow of income, but not by immediate shortages of
cash.
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3 Convergence
This section studies the convergence property of the model when the optimum quantity
of money is distributed. The convergence property is of interest because it gives us some
intuition of whether the distribution of money matters in the long run. During the transi-
tion the endogenous bound I (t) is time dependent. If for all t we have I (t) ≥ n, the law
of motion proceeds according to the following system of nonlinear diﬀerential equations:
m˙ = g (m(t)) = P (t)m(t) (5)
where P (t) =
−ps pb 0 · · · 0 0 0
ps −ps − pb pb · · · 0 0 0
0 ps −ps − pb · · · 0 0 0
0 0 ps · · · 0 0 0
· · · · · · · · ·
0 0 0 · · · pb 0 0
0 0 0 · · · −ps − pb pb 0
0 0 0 · · · ps −ps − pb pb
0 0 0 · · · 0 ps −pb
Proposition 2 For any n, there is a critical value C¯ > 0 defined in the proof such that if
C ≤ C¯, any initial distribution of the optimum amount of money n
2
converges asymptoti-
cally to the uniform distribution.
Proposition 2 provides a suﬃcient condition that guarantees convergence to the sta-
tionary distribution from an arbitrary distribution of the optimum quantity of money.
The suﬃcient condition is essentially a restriction on the production cost that guarantees
that the exogenous bound on money holdings, n, remains binding at all times, i.e., that
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I (t) > n for all t. The first part of the proof of Proposition 2 involves Liapounov’s sec-
ond method, which is described in Lemma 3.4 Denote the gradient vector, Hf (m(t)), by
Hf (m(t)) =
³
∂f
∂m0 , ...,
∂f
∂mn
´
.
Lemma 3 Let X ⊂ <s be compact, and let g : X → X be continuous with g (m) = m for
some m ∈ X. Suppose there exists a continuous function f : X → < that satisfies
a) f (m(t)) ≥ 0, with equality if and only if m(t) = m,
b) f˙ (m(t)) = Hf (m(t)) g (m(t)) ≤ 0, with equality if and only if m(t) = m.
Then m is a globally stable solution to the set of nonlinear diﬀerential equations m˙ =
g (m(t)).
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof involves two steps. First, it is shown that (5) is
globally (asymptotically) stable if on the equilibrium path at any point of time I (t) ≥ n.
Second, a suﬃcient condition is derived that guarantees that during the entire transition
to the stationary distribution one has I (t) ≥ n.
First step. To prove the global stability of (5) when I (t) ≥ n, one has to find a
Liapounov function that is a continuous function and that satisfies conditions a) and b) of
Lemma 3. In the following I show that the function f (m) =
Pn
i=0 (mi(t)−mi)
2 satisfies
these conditions. Note, first, that X = {m ∈ In+1 :Pni=0mi = 1 and Pni=0 imi = n2} and
thatX is compact and convex. f (m) is continuous, and condition a) is satisfied. Condition
b) implies
f˙ =
nX
i=0
2 (mi −mi) m˙i ≤ 0 (6)
Because
Pn
i=0mim˙i = m
Pn
i=0 m˙i = 0, (6) is reduced to
Pn
i=0mim˙i ≤ 0. Use (5) to get
ps
Ã
n−1X
i=0
m2i −
n−1X
i=0
mimi+1
!
+ pb
Ã
nX
i=1
m2i −
n−1X
i=0
mimi+1
!
≥ 0 (7)
4The proof of Lemma 3 can be found, for example, in Stokey and Lucas (1989, p. 139ﬀ.).
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After manipulations of (7) one gets
(2−m0 −mn)
n−1X
i=0
(mi −mi+1)2 ≥ (m0 −mn)2 (m0 +mn) (8)
Denote by LHS(m) (RHS(m)) the left-hand (right-hand) side of (8). For any m0 and mn,
LHS(m) is minimized when mi =
(n−i)m0+imn
n
, i = 1, .., n − 1. To see this, diﬀerentiatePn−1
i=0 (mi −mi+1)
2 with respect to mi, i = 1, .., n− 1, to get mi = mi−1+mi+12 . Solve these
equations to get
mi =
(n− i)m0 + imn
n
, i = 0, .., n. (9)
Denote by X˜ the set of all probability measures that solve (9). Next, note that for any
m ∈ X˜, (8) holds with equality. This implies that for any m ∈ X, m /∈ X˜, m0 = m˜0, and
mn = m˜n
LHS(m) > LHS(m˜) = RHS(m˜) = RHS(m) (10)
To proceed, use
Pn
i=0mi = 1 and (9) to get
(m0 +mn) (n+ 1) = 2 (11)
Next,
Pn
i=0 imi =
n
2
and (9) yield
(1 + n) (mn (1 + 2n) +m0 (n− 1))
6
=
n
2
(12)
The unique solution to (11) and (12) is m0 = mn = 1n+1 = m, and accordingly we have
mi = m, i = 1, .., n, and (8) holds with equality, as required by condition b). This result
and (10) confirm that f (m) satisfies condition b). Hence, f (m) is a Liapounov function.
Second step. During the transition the endogenous bound I (t) could fall below n.
In the following a bound on C is derived, denoted by C¯, such that if C ≤ C¯, at any
point of time we have I (t) ≥ n. For any initial distribution m of the optimum quantity
of money n
2
, denote by Cm the value of C such that h (m) = V n(m) − V n−1 (m) = C. If
C ≤ Cm, then h (m) ≥ C. To see that h (m) > 0 note that at any point of time we have
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ps = αx (1−m0) > 0 because if m0 = 1 then M < n2 , and pb = αx (1−mn) > 0 because
if mn = 1 then M > n2 . Denote by mˆ the initial distribution of the optimum quantity of
money that minimizes h (m), and denote by C¯ the value of C such that h (mˆ) = C. Because
ps(mˆ), pb(mˆ) > 0, we have C¯ > 0. If C ≤ C¯, then I (mˆ) ≥ n. Because mˆ minimizes h (m),
for all m we have h (m) ≥ C¯, and accordingly, if C ≤ C¯, then I (m) ≥ n for all m. Thus,
if C ≤ C¯, at any point of time we have I (t) ≥ n. Consequently, any initial distribution of
the optimum amount of money converges asymptotically to the uniform distribution. ¥
Three comments are in order here. First, the condition C ≤ C¯ is suﬃcient but not
necessary for convergence. There are distributions that converge to the uniform distribution
even when C > C¯. Second, as for the characterization of the stationary equilibria, the
uniqueness result is derived by assuming that during the transition goods and money must
exchange one for one. Without this assumption multiple equilibria are likely to occur.
Third, a redistribution of money aﬀects welfare, although only temporarily. The welfare
eﬀect is ambiguous and depends on the initial distribution.
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4 Summary
This paper studies stationary and nonstationary distributions of money. For this purpose it
relaxes the one-storage technology imposed in the early versions of the random-matching
model of money by considering a model where agents can accumulate money up to the
bound n ∈ N+. The following results emerge from the model. First, the quantity of money
M = n
2
and the uniform distribution mi = 1n+1 , i = 0, ..., n, maximize welfare. This
result generalizes the welfare result of Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993), where, in the
absence of barter trades, the optimum amount of money is 1
2
. Second, if C ≤ C¯, any initial
distribution of the optimum amount of money converges asymptotically to the uniform
distribution of money holdings. This result, although derived under the assumption of given
prices, supports Friedman’s conjecture about the long-run irrelevance of the distribution
of money. Although Friedman does not discuss this issue in detail, his conjecture is that a
nonstationary distribution “will introduce initial distribution eﬀects. During the transition,
some men will have net gains in consumption, others net losses in consumption. But the
ultimate position will be the same, not only for the aggregate, but for each individual
separately” (1969, p. 6).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 In a steady state, the measure of agents who leave state i equals the
measure of agents that enter this state. All steady state conditions are summarized below:
n : pbmn = psmn−1
n− 1 : (pb + ps)mn−1 = pbmn + psmn−2
...
1 : (pb + ps)m1 = pbm2 + psm0
0 : psm0 = pbm1
(13)
These conditions imply
pbmi = psmi−1, i = 1, .., n, (14)
mi =
m2i−1
mi−2
, i = 2, .., n (15)
Solving (15) recursively yields (2). Combine (2) with
Pn
i=0mi = 1 to get (3). Then, divide
mi = m
(n−in )
0 m
( in)
n by mi+1 = m
(n−i−1n )
0 m
( i+1n )
n to get m0mn =
³
mi
mi+1
´n
. This and (14) yield
(4).
I next show uniqueness of the stationary probability measure m for any n and money
supply M ∈ (0, n). The first thing to note is that (3) implies ∂mn∂m0 < 0. Thus, for any n
and m0 there is a unique m that satisfies (2) and (3). Next, note that (4) implies that m0
is monotonically decreasing inM (to see this note that the right-hand side of (4) is strictly
decreasing inm0; thus, an increase inm0 reduces the ratios mimi−1 , i = 1, ..., n). Accordingly,
for any n and M ∈ [0, n] there is a unique probability measure m satisfying (2) and (3).
¥
Proof of Lemma 2 The proof involves two steps. First, the critical value C˜ is derived.
Second, existence and uniqueness are shown for C ≤ C˜.
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First step. When all agents with money holdings i < n produce and sell for money,
the system of value functions (1) is reduced to
rV 0 = ps
¡
V 1 − V 0 − C
¢
rV i = pb
¡
U + V i−1 − V i
¢
+ ps
¡
V i+1 − V i − C
¢
, i = 0, ..., n− 1 (16)
rV n = pb
¡
U + V n−1 − V n
¢
.
(16) defines a second-order linear nonhomogeneous diﬀerence equation with constant coef-
ficients and constant term and two initial conditions. The second equation is the diﬀerence
equation, and the first and third equations are the initial conditions. The solution is
V i = φ1λ
i
1 + φ2λ
i
2 + µ (17)
where
λ1,λ2 =
pb + ps + r ∓
q
(pb + ps + r)
2 − 4pspb
2ps
(18)
φ1 =
(1− λ2) (pbλn2U − psλ1C)
r
¡
λn+12 − λn+11
¢ , φ2 = (1− λ1) (psλ2C − pbλn1U)
r
¡
λn+12 − λn+11
¢ (19)
µ =
pbU − psC
r
(20)
One can show that the roots satisfy 0 < λ1 < 1 and λ2 > 1.
Note that V i is concave, i.e., V i − V i−1 − (V i+1 − V i) ≥ 0, i = 1, .., n− 1. Thus, it is
suﬃcient to show that agents with money holdings n− 1 produce for money, i.e.,
V n − V n−1 ≥ C (21)
C˜ is the value of C such that (21) holds with equality, which implies that if C ≤ C˜ then
I ≥ n. Use (17), (18), (19), and (20) to get C˜ = λ
n
1λn2 (λ2−λ1)U
λn1 (1−λ1)−λn2 (1−λ2)
.
Second step. Consider, first, condition i) of Definition 1, consider any n and M ∈
(0, n), and assume that m is the unique stationary distribution characterized in Lemma 1.
Then, for C ≤ C˜, agents are willing to accumulate money up to the bound n. Consider,
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next, condition ii). When agents are willing to sell for money up to the bound n, by
Lemma 1 m is the unique stationary probability measure we are looking for. Consider,
finally, condition iii). Because ps > 0 and pb > 0, we have V > 0. ¥
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